Information Transparency and Value: Can you value what you can't see?
It is clear that some firms are more forthcoming about their financial affairs than other firms, and that the financial statements of a few firms are designed to obscure rather than reveal information. While differences in accounting standards across countries was viewed as the primary culprit for this lack of transparency until recent years, the convergence in accounting standards globally has made it clear that no matter how strict accounting standards are, firms will continue to use their discretionary power to spin and manipulate the numbers that they convey to financial markets. The questions we face in valuation are significant ones. How do we reflect the transparency (or the opacity) of a firm's financial statements in its value? Should we reward firms that have simpler and more open financial statements and punish firms that have complex and difficult-to-understand financial statements? If so, which input in valuation should be the one that we adjust? This paper begins by examining the phenomenon of opacity in financial statements and why some firms choose to be opaque. It follows up by considering some of the empirical evidence on whether markets discount the value of complex firms to reflect the difficult faced in valuing them. It closes by evaluating some of the ways in which we can adjust discounted cash flow valuation models for this difficulty. market capitalization, the same overall market risk exposure and the same financial leverage.
Assume that both firms have the same operating earnings, similar returns on capital and that you expect the same growth rate in the operating income. Finally, assume that firm A is a firm in a single business with open and easy-to-understand financial statements whereas firm B is a firm in multiple businesses with complex and difficult-to-decipher financial statements. In conventional discounted cash flow valuation, we would attach the same value to both firms. 1 Most investors, however, would value firm A more highly than firm B, thus discounting the latter firm's value for both its complexity and its opaque financial statements. Are they being irrational or are we missing an important aspect of value in discounted cash flow models? We do not think investors are irrational, and we will present an argument that we should consider these issues in valuation. We will begin by looking at the sources of and reasons for complexity in financial statements, and then look at ways in which we can adapt valuation models
Sources of Complexity
The financial statements of firms are made complex by a number of factors, some of which are external to the firms, like accounting standards (often designed to force more information disclosure) and some of which are the consequence of operating and financial decisions made by the firm. In this section, we will consider these factors.
Inconsistency in applying accounting principles
The accounting standards that are on the books today were originally written for manufacturing firms that dominated business forty years ago, and have been amended and modified to fit the very different firms that exist in the market today. The accounting rules developed for the industrial age have not traveled well into the information age. The way in which the intangible assets of technology firms are valued in balance sheets offers some of the most visible example of the shortcomings and contradictions that bedevil current day accounting. To illustrate, a firm that buys a patent from another firm will show the patent as an asset, whereas another firm that develops a similar patent based upon internal research will not show the patent as an asset at all. 2 But there are other examples. A retail firm that borrows money and buys its store sites will show the sites as assets and the borrowing as debt, but a competing retail firm that leases these store sites will often show not show any of the leases as debt and no assets. 3 The ways in which accounting statements deal with employee options and acquisitions have also created problems for investors over the last few decades. Firms that use options to reward managers and employees clearly use them as management compensation. It stands to reason, therefore, that these options should be valued and treated as operating expenses in the period in which they are granted. Under current accounting standards, we ignore these options when they are granted and consider them only when they are exercised. 4 The use of pooling and purchase accounting in acquisitions has allowed firms that qualify for pooling to essentially hide the cost of acquisitions from most investors. 5 Why might this add to the complexity of financial statements? Depending upon what assets they invest in, and how they structure these investments, firms can hide assets 2 This is a direct consequence of the fact that money spent on research and development is expensed in the year of the expenditure, even though it is really investment for the future, i.e. capital expenditure (which should be spread out over time).
3 Most retail store leases are operating leases and are treated as operating expenses in the United States.
Outside the United States, almost all leases are treated as operating expenses.
4 Even at exercise, firms use different practices to reflect the exercise of options. Some show the exercise value as expenses, while others make the adjustments to book equity in the balance sheet.
5 With pooling, firms can add up the book values of the acquiring and acquired firm and report it as book value for the combined firm. The premium paid over book value is ignored. In purchase accounting, the premium over book value show sup as goodwill on the combined firm's balance sheet and is amortized over time.
and debt from investors. To be fair to accountants, there is usually enough information provided in the footnotes to financial statements to correct for many of the inconsistencies in the United States. 6 
Fuzzy Accounting Standards
In the last few years, we have acquired a sense of how much discretionary power firms have in how the measurement of income and capital. During the 1990s, for instance, more aggressive firms used the leeway that was available to them in the accounting standards to report higher earnings, lower capital invested and much higher returns on capital. Consider three examples:
• One Time Charges: Firms have been increasingly inventive in their use of one-time and non-operating charges to move normal operating expenses below the operating income line. In fact, the appearance of these charges year after year essentially overstates operating income and can simultaneously reduce the book value of capital invested. 7 • Hidden Assets: Firms have also used the wiggle room in accounting standards to move assets and debt off their books, using special purpose entities and partnerships. 8 While some of these firms use these entities as legitimate devices to reduce their cost of debt and then provide information about their existence in their financial statements, others use them to hide their indebtedness from the public.
• Earnings Smoothing: Firms have used a variety of techniques to smooth earnings out over periods. In the 1990s, Microsoft routinely underestimated its earnings from upgrades to both operating and applications software, building up a reserve it could draw on in those quarters where its true earnings threatened to fall short of earnings expectations. Intel reported the price appreciation on the equity investments it had in other companies as profit and used these additional earnings to meet market expectations. During the stock market boom of the 1990s, some firms reported 6 See my working papers on converting operating leases into debt and research and development into assets on my web site.
7 In fact, analysts coined the term EBBS (Earnings before bad stuff) to represent the reported operating earnings of some of the more aggressive firms.
8 Using quirks in accounting rules, a firm can carve out some of its assets into a special purpose entity and have the entity issue debt. If the assets carved out are low risk (say receivables), the debt that is issued will often have a lower interest rate. some of their excess pension fund assets as profits. 9 What harm is done by these practices? For better or worse, investors who look at earnings stability as a measure of equity risk are misled into believing that these firms (and others like them) are less risky than they truly are.
Does this mean that we should eliminate all discretionary power granted to firms?
We do not believe so, since there are clearly one-time expenses and income that should be separated from operating expenses and income. Can more effective policing by auditors prevent this type of abuse? Perhaps, but we seriously doubt it. In other words, no matter how strictly an accounting rule is written, there will be some firms that are more aggressive than others in their interpretation of the rule.
Unintended Consequences of "Increased Disclosure"
Over the last three decades, we have seen an increasing focus on information disclosure in accounting statements. While this trend has its roots in the United States, it has spread to other markets as well. While the objective of increased disclosure is noble -to provide investors with more information about the companies that they invest in -there have been unintended side consequences that are not so favorable. First, the proliferation of accounting rules and the level of detail required in reporting have made financial statements more and more complex. For example, consider the liability side of the balance sheet of a typical U.S. firm. Thirty years ago, it would have shown current liabilities (accounts payable, supplier credit and short term debt), long term debt (bank loans and corporate bonds) and shareholders' equity (paid-in capital and retained earnings). Today, you would see in addition to these three items, a host of other liabilities including unfunded pension liabilities and health care benefits and provisions for future legal liabilities. Second, the increasing level of detail both in the financial statements themselves and the footnotes that follow often obscures more important information about the firm. In other words, financial statements sometimes become data dumps that are difficult to navigate for investors.
To provide an illustration of how much accounting rules have added to the heft of financial statements, we looked at the number of pages in the 10Ks filed by Procter and Gamble, with the SEC starting in 1981 and going through 2000. While some of this increase can be traced to the increasing complexity of P&G's business, a large portion of it reflects the effects of new accounting edicts and rules.
Business Mix
Some firms are more complex than others simply because they operate in multiple businesses, often with little in common. General Electric, for instance, has operations in more than 10 distinct businesses, with very different margins and risk profiles. Analyzing GE is therefore more difficult than analyzing a firm like Adobe Systems, a firm that produces and sells only software. Why do firms get into different and often unrelated businesses? In the 1960s and 1970s, the impetus came from the desire to diversify, which it was argued, would reduce risk. In the 1980s, the argument was that a well-run firm could take over poorly run firms in other businesses and use its superior management to increase value. Whether these benefits actually materialize is open to question., but the complexity added to financial statements is one potential cost.
It should be noted, though, that firms with complex business mixes do not necessarily have to have complex financial statements. They can provide information broken down in sufficient detail to allow investors to assess the value of the individual components.
In some cases, firms can issue tracking stock on individual divisions to allow investors to get an assessment of the market value of the businesses. 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Structuring of Business
When firms enter new markets or businesses, the way they structure these businesses can have an effect on the resulting complexity. For instance, a firm that keeps each business separate should be easier to value than a firm that envelops all the businesses into one entity. In some cases, firms can exacerbate problems by creating subsidiaries for each of their businesses and holding less than 100% of these subsidiaries. In the United States, for instance, a firm that owns 51% of a subsidiary will have to consolidate its statements and show minority interests as a liability. 10 A firm that owns only 15% of a subsidiary may show only its shares of the dividends in the subsidiary and reflect none of the assets and liabilities of the subsidiary on its balance sheet. A good example of complexity created by structuring would be Coca Cola's split-up of its bottlers in the 1980s. By making these bottlers independent entities and reducing its ownership in the bottlers below the majority threshold, Coca Cola was able to take its lowest return assets of its books and report significantly higher returns on capital. In reality, however, the partial ownership of the bottlers obscures the true returns and financial leverage of the consolidated firm. After all, Coca Cola and its bottlers are a composite entity, with the value of one deriving from the existence of the other.
The problems with cross holdings are most visible at Asian companies, especially the older conglomerates. The complicated cross holdings at these firms reflect not just the long history of these firms as private businesses (where the intent was to report as little in earnings as profits) but the current desire on the part of the incumbent managers to control these firms with minimal holdings. In some cases, the cross holdings are in other private businesses, with little or no information provides on these businesses.
Financial Choices
Three decades ago, a firm's choices when it came to financing were straightforward.
You could use common stock (equity) or bank loans/ corporate bonds (debt) and reflect the amounts raised from each on your balance sheet. As financing choices have proliferated, and new and different ways of raising funds (convertibles, warrants and other hybrids) have come into being, the balance sheet has become more complicated. An entirely new category of funding that accountants call quasi-equity, representing hybrid securities (which are part debt and part equity) now plays a prominent role in many balance sheets. Firms have also become more inventive (with the help of investment bankers) at keeping debt off their books.
Consider one example. In the early 1990s, investment bankers created a security called monthly income preferred stock (MIPs). These securities allowed firms to generate the tax benefits of debt but were treated as equity by the ratings agencies. This freed firms that otherwise would not have been able to borrow, because of bond ratings constraints, to use MIPs for expansion and investments. While ratings agencies did catch on over time, creative bankers devised newer and more complicated instruments to let companies borrow money without having the tag "debt" attached to it. The process culminated in the collapse of Enron, a company where the accumulated debt in hidden partnerships and entities eventually came together to destroy the firm.
In Summary
Complexity in accounting statements is a reflection of both broad trends in accounting that affect all companies and conscious choices made by firms on business mixes and how they structure and present the results of their operations (accounting and financing choices). Thus, a firm that is in a single business can end up with very complex (and difficult to understand) financial statements because it uses complex financial instruments to raise funds and is aggressive in its accounting choices. A firm with a complex business mix can work to make its financial statements transparent by going well beyond the legal requirements of disclosure. 11 By the same token, you may find the financial statements of a firm in emerging markets with weak disclosure requirements to be more transparent than the financial statements of a firm in the United States, with its stronger disclosure requirements.
Reasons for Complexity
Firms with complicated financial statements have to bear much of the responsibility for the complexity, no matter how strong or weak the accounting standards are. This is because accounting standards establish a floor on what has to be revealed and not a ceiling. Firms that want to reveal more to their investors can always do so. Infosys, an Indian software firm, for example, has financial statements that are more transparent than those provided by most U.S. firms, even though Indian accounting standards on disclosure are much weaker than U.S. accounting standards. In this section, we consider some of the reasons why firms may choose to make their financial statements more diffuse and difficult to understand.
Control
Many incumbent managers fear hostile takeovers, since they will lose their power after these takeovers. They attempt to preempt hostile acquirers by structuring a bewildering array of subsidiaries and holding companies to hold their assets and by creating new financial securities -common stock with different voting rights, for example. How do these actions keep hostile acquirers away? First, information that is not available to investors is also unavailable to potential hostile acquirers, making it difficult for them to detect when a firm's assets are being poorly managed and under valued. Second, the complicated holding structure and financial instruments used by the firm can make it difficult to gain effective control of the firm.
In Asia and Latin America, for instance, family run firms have used cross holdings to effectively cement control in the hands of family members. By not providing complete information on the cross holdings, they make it difficult for stockholders who want to ask them relevant questions about the profitability and value of these investments.
Tax Benefits
Firms can sometimes reduce their tax burden by creating holding structures in lowtax domiciles. For instance, it is not uncommon for firms in the United States to have subsidiaries in tax-exempt locales such as the Cayman Islands and to funnel income into these subsidiaries. 12 Complex holding structures also allow firms to shift income from one subsidiary to another, using transfer pricing and inter-company loans. In other words, firms cannot afford to be transparent with shareholders if they prefer opacity when it comes to the tax authorities. As a general proposition, complexity in tax laws will generate complexity in financial statements. Legislators who bemoan the latter should consider their role in creating the former.
Deceit
We have saved the most odious of the reasons for complexity for last. Firms sometimes create complex structures to fool investors into believing that they (the firms) are worth more than they really are or that they owe less money than they truly do. In many cases, what starts as a small evasion mushrooms over time to become a large one, and when the truth comes, as it inevitably will, there are large economic and social costs. The executives at these firms will complain mightily about the accusations of deceit, and they will usually find ways to rationalize their actions. 13 Note, though, that investors and analysts should not be relieved of their responsibility when firms pull off these con games.
For the deceit to work, you often need analysts who look the other way and do not ask tough questions of managers, and investors who base their investment choices on past history and little analysis.
Measuring Complexity
While investors and analysts may increasingly bemoan the increasing complexity of financial statements, there is no simple or easy measure of complexity. There are some who would argue that they know complexity when they see it, but this is not a very satisfying or objective measure of complexity. In this section, we consider some ways in which we can measure the complexity of a firm's financial statements:
Volume of data in financial statement
A simplistic (but surprisingly effective) measure of complexity is the sheer volume of data in a financial statement. For instance, the 10K filings made by firms with the SEC range in size from less than 100 pages to in excess of 400 pages. In table 1, we summarize the length of the filings for the 2000 financial year for the 10 largest market capitalization firms in the United States. 
The Opacity Index
In the late 1990s, Price Waterhouse developed an "opacity index" to measure the transparency (or absence thereof) of financial statements in different countries. Defining opacity as the "the lack of clear, accurate, formal, easily discernible, and widely accepted practices", Price Waterhouse looked at five factors.
where i indexes the countries and:
O refers to the composite O-Factor (the final score);
C refers to the impact of corrupt practices;
L refers to the effect of legal and judicial opacity (including shareholder rights); E refers to economic/policy opacity;
A refers to accounting/corporate governance opacity; and R refers to the impact of regulatory opacity and uncertainty/arbitrariness.
They based the country scores for each factor on a survey of CFOs, equity analysts, bankers and Price Waterhouse employees in 35 countries in the third and fourth quarters of 2000. The survey responses were converted into a numerical score and weighted to arrive at each country's opacity measure. Table 2 summarizes the results for the 35 countries. 
An Information Based Index
One way to think about complexity is to begin with the inputs that go into the value of a company and consider all those factors that may make deriving those inputs more difficult in a measure of complexity. For instance, one of the inputs you need to value a firm is risk. It is more difficult to estimate risk parameters for firms that are in multiple businesses than it is for firms that are in a single business for two reasons -different businesses can have different risk profiles and changes in the mix can change the overall firm's risk profile.
Breaking down the valuation inputs into their main components, we can identify the factors that determine complexity: Table 3 represents an attempt (undoubtedly incomplete) to list out these factors. The contributions made by each of the factors to complexity vary, with some factors (such as volatile effective tax rates) being less important than others (substantial cross holdings in private companies). How much we weight each factor will depend upon how much of the value is attributable to it, and whether it makes estimation more difficult or impossible. To illustrate, operating leases and R&D expenses undoubtedly skew financial statements, resulting in misstated earnings and meaningless book values, but there is enough information usually available in financial statements for analysts to correct the problems. In contrast, earnings that are not clearly identified as non-operating or onetime earnings cannot be easily be incorporated into value.
Once we have identified the factors that determine complexity, and categorize them based upon their importance, you can construct complexity scores for firms. These complexity scores should allow us to distinguish between more complex and less complex firms, and to adjust value for complexity (if necessary). Appendix 1 contains one such attempt to come up with a complexity score. 
Consequences of Complexity
When financial statements are not transparent, you cannot estimate the fundamental inputs that you need to examine to value a firm. For instance, a firm's expected growth should be a function of how much it reinvests (reinvestment rate) and how well it reinvests (its return on capital). If firms funnel their investments through holding companies that are hidden from investors, you cannot assess either of these inputs. To evaluate a firm's cost of capital, you need to know how much debt is owed by the firm, as well as the cost of this debt. For firms that hide a significant portion of their debt, you will underestimate the default risk that the firm is exposed to, and consequently, its cost of capital. Does this mean that the value of a complex firm is more difficult to estimate than the value of a simple firm? The answer is yes, but it does not necessarily follow that investors will discount the value of complex firms because of this uncertainty. In fact, companies like General Electric, IBM
and Tyco prospered in the 1990s, even as they became more complex. While some would argue that the increase in value came in spite of their complexity, there are others who would present the case that it was because of it. In this section, we consider some of the empirical evidence on the relationship between firm value and complexity.
The Cost of Opacity
In the last section, we referred to the opacity index developed by Price Waterhouse to measure the opacity of transparency of financial statements in 35 countries. In an interesting extension, Price Waterhouse also attempted to examine the impact of the opacity index on two variables that have direct consequences for value. The first was a "taxequivalent" cost, where the opacity measure was converted into an equivalent tax rate. As they note in their report, an increase in the opacity index from the Singapore level (which is the most transparent) to the Chinese level is the equivalent of an increase in the tax rate of 46%. In an alternate measure of the cost of complexity, Price Waterhouse measured the default spread on sovereign bonds issued by countries over the U.S. treasury and argued that this was a cost of complexity, since more complex companies tended to have much lower bond ratings.
The Conglomerate Discount
In the last two decades, evidence has steadily mounted that markets discount the value of conglomerates, relative to single-business (or pure play) firms. In a study in 1999, Villalonga compared the ratio of market value to replacement cost (Tobin's Q) for diversified firms and specialized firms and reported that the former traded at a discount of about 8% on the latter. Similar results were reported in earlier studies. 14 The reasons for the discount have been widely debated, with many attributing it to the lack of focus in these firms and the inefficiencies that follow. Another possible reason for the discount may be the complexity that gets added to financial statements as firms enter multiple businesses. Even the best efforts of these firms to be more transparent often cannot overcome this problem. First, conglomerates inevitably consolidate costs for some functions -after all, one reason for creating conglomerates is to create economies of scale -and these consolidated costs then have to be allocated to the multiple divisions (businesses) that the firm is in. These allocations are subjective and investors may be dubious about the resulting bottom-line numbers. Second, the absence of market prices for the individual divisions makes it difficult for investors to see the value of each division and consider the market reactions to actions taken by that division.
How can we differentiate between discounts attributable to management inefficiencies and those caused by accounting complexity? We can look at market reactions to conglomerates that do break up to create independent entities run by incumbent management. If the reason for the discount is accounting complexity alone, splitting the firm into independent businesses, with their own financial statements (and perhaps their own tracking stock) while preserving incumbent management control of the overall entity should eliminate the discount. If, on the other hand, it is management inefficiency that is the problem, you should expect to see the discount persist even after the split-up, since only divestitures will eliminate the underlying problem of poor management. The market reaction to spin offs and divestitures tends to be positive, with the size of the reaction increasing in proportion to the spin off. This suggests that the cause of the discount may vary from firm to firm.
Other Evidence
The other evidence on complexity is scattered over a number of different studies.
There is evidence that is consistent with the notion that investors do discount stock prices for complexity, though the extent of the discount is debatable.
• Morgan Stanley, in a study of annual reports, found that stock returns were inversely proportional to the number of pages in the report. Firms with long (and often expensive reports) had the worst returns among the stocks they examined.
This suggests that firms often use useless detail to bury valuable facts in reports.
• Emerging markets that change their accounting standards to increase transparency usually report strong positive reactions to these changes, with investors being willing to pay more for stocks in these markets.
• When firms in emerging markets have ADRs listed on the U.S. market, their stock prices react positively. While there are a number of possible explanations for this phenomenon, one is that these firms often have to restate their financial statements using generally accepted accounting principles in the United States.
• The positive reactions associated with spin-offs, split-offs and divestitures can also be viewed as indirect evidence that market reward transparency. Linn and Rozeff (1984) examined the price reaction to announcements of divestitures by firms and reported an average excess return of 1.45% for 77 divestitures between 1977 and 1982. They also noted an interesting contrast between firms that announce the sale price and motive for the divestiture at the time of the divestiture, and those that do not: in general, markets react much more positively to the first group than to the second, as shown in Table 5 . The market clearly seems to be rewarding transparency at least about this specific action. • Finally, the positive returns associated with the issue of tracking stock can be viewed as evidence that markets reward companies that provide more financial information and a market estimate of value for individual businesses that they operate in.
Some contrary evidence
Is there any evidence that complexity is rewarded by investors? It may not be a coincidence that complexity seems to increase during bull markets and periods of investor optimism. Perhaps, investors in their exuberance are willing to overlook complex financial statements and trust managers more during such periods. It is also entirely possible that these investors are being irrational, as Mr. Greenspan argued they were during the late 1990s. Whatever the reasons, worries about complexity seem to rise in the aftermath of an investment disaster, usually caused by a firm that overreaches and implodes. 15 There is one possible scenario where complexity may be rewarded. If investors trust managers and complexity is used to reduce the tax burden and regulatory constraints on the firm -the tax and regulatory authorities are kept in the dark with investors -you can have extended periods where the stock price rises. It is extremely unlikely, however, that any firm can pull off this feat in the long term.
Dealing with Complexity
Reviewing the last few sections, we can now state the three basic questions that we have to address in dealing with transparency in valuation:
a. What do we use as a measure of complexity in valuation?
b. Should we reflect this complexity in value?
c. If we decide to do so, how do we value complexity (or transparency)?
In prior sections, we have established that while measures of complexity exist, the ultimate test is a subjective one, and that the more complex a financial statement becomes, the more difficult it is to get basic information you need to complete a valuation. We have also shown some evidence, though none of it is conclusive, that complexity does affect value negatively.
In this section, we consider three possible responses to complexity when valuing a company. The first two represent the extreme views. One is to ignore assets that you cannot see through the fog of financial statements entirely. The other is to ignore complexity entirely in valuation and trust management to tell the truth about their performance and future prospect. The last approach tries to take a middle ground, where invisible assets are valued, though the value may be discounted.
Don't value what you cannot see
The most conservative approach to dealing with complexity is to demand information about all assets owned by a firm and all of its outstanding debt. When the information is not forthcoming or is incomplete, you view the assets as worthless. To a risk-averse investor, this may seem not only sensible but prudent. If all investors adopted this approach, firms with valuable assets would, it is argued, be forced to be forthcoming.
There is some merit to this argument but it has a potential downside. If most firms have complex financial statements and other investors are less demanding than you are, you many very well end up as a bystander in the equity market. If that is not a viable optionyou may be the manager of an equity mutual fund who is required to be fully invested in equities at all times -you may have to bend on these rules. The problems become even worse if you have to invest in younger or higher growth companies, where the reason for the complexity may be the business itself and not intransigent management. Even if a Cisco or a Biogen were absolutely forthcoming about their research and development expenses and acquisitions, you may still find yourself short of the information that you need to correctly assess their value.
Trust the firm to reveal the truth
At the other extreme, you can trust the managers of the firm with invisible assets to tell you the truth about these assets. Why would they do this? If managers are long-term investors in the company, it is argued, they would not risk their long term credibility and value for the sake of a short term price gain (obtained by providing misleading information).
While there might be information that is not available to investors about these invisible assets, the risk should be diversifiable and thus should not have an effect on value. 16 This view of the world is not irrational but it does run into two fundamental problems. First, managers can take substantial short term profits by manipulating the numbers (and then exercising options and selling their stock) which may well overwhelm whatever concerns they have about long term value and credibility. Second, even managers who are concerned about long term value may delude themselves into believing their own forecasts, optimistic though they might be. It is not surprising, therefore, that firms become sloppy during periods of sustained economic growth. Secure in the notion that there will never be another recession (at least not in the near future), they adopt aggressive accounting practices that overstate earnings. Investors, lulled by the rewards that they generate by investing in stocks during these periods, accept these practices with few questions. 
Adjust the value for complexity
Is there a middle road between the two extremes? Can we value assets in complex companies while considering the potential for managers to mislead markets? In this section, we will present four practical ways in which we can adjust a discounted cash flow valuation for the complexity of financial statements. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive and represent solutions to different types of disclosure problems.
Adjust the cash flows
The simplest way to deal with complexity is to adjust the cashflows of firms for the complexity of their financial statements. In simple terms, you apply a discount to the expected cashflows, with the magnitude of the discount increasing for more complex companies. This process, called "haircutting the cashflows", is very common both in capital budgeting and valuation, though the discounts applied tend to be both arbitrary and reflect factors other than complexity (such as risk). 18 To make this a little more objective, we would suggest the following steps:
a. Identify how much of the earnings of the firm come from assets that are invisible or not clearly identified. In particular, focus on earnings from holdings in private businesses (or special purpose entities) as well as other non-operating income (such as income from pension funds and non-recurring tansactions)
b. Assign a probability that management of the firm can be trusted with their
forecasts. This is difficult to do, but it should reflect both objective and subjective factors. Among the objective factors is the history of the firm -past accounting restatements or errors will weigh against the management -and the quality of corporate governance -firms with strong and independent boards should be more likely to be telling the truth. The subjective factors come from your experiences with the management of the firm, though some managers can be likeable and persuasive, even when they are misrepresenting the facts.
In fact, the conversion of opacity into an implicit tax by Price Waterhouse represents a discounting of the cashflows. You could increase the tax rate for complex firms and estimate the cashflows for the firm with the higher tax rate. The lower expected cashflows will result in lower value. This approach is most appropriate when you are unsure about the current earnings of the firm (as stated in their financial statements) and feel that they might be overstated.
An alternative approach that may be simpler is to replace the inputs for the firm with more sustainable numbers. Thus, you would change the operating margin of the firm from its reported value to the industry average and the effective tax rate to the marginal tax rate.
The management of the firm will complain mightily that you are being unfair in your valuation, but the onus should be on management to provide the information that allows you to believe that they can sustain higher margins and lower tax rates.
Adjust the Discount Rate
You can also adjust the discount rate -the costs of equity and capital -that you use to discount the cash flows for complexity. In practical terms, you will increase the costs of equity and capital for firms with more complex financial statements, relative to firms with more transparent statements. There are three ways in which you can make this adjustment:
a. Estimate the historical risk premium attached to complex firms by comparing the returns you would have made on a portfolio of complex firms historically to the returns you would have earned on a market index. For instance, if you would have earned 18.3% over the last 20 years investing complex firms and only 14.1% investing in the S&P 500 index, the risk premium associated with complex firms is 4.2%. You can add this directly to the cost of equity of complex firms. The problems with this approach are two-fold. First, classifying firms into complex and simple firms is both difficult and subjective. Second, as firms change over time, you can have simple firms become complex (or vice versa), making it difficult to keep the portfolios intact.
b. Adjust the betas of complex firms for the lack of the transparency. If you trust markets, it is possible that the betas of complex firms will be higher than the betas of simple firms. 19 Unfortunately, the high standard errors in beta estimates and the changing nature of firms may make this difficult to do. Thus, the beta adjustment is likely to be arbitrary in most cases.
c. Relate the adjustment of the discount rate to the information that is not provided in the financial statements. You can estimate the beta of a firm by taking a weighted average of the betas of the businesses it is in. To do this, you need to be told what businesses a firm is in and how much value the firm derives from each business. If the financial statements are so opaque that you cannot get one or another of these two pieces of information for some of the businesses that the firm operates in, you should err on the side of caution and assume that these businesses are much riskier than the rest of the firm and attach a large enough weight to these businesses to make the overall beta increase.
d. If the complexity is not in the asset side of the balance sheet but on the liability sidesignificant off-balance sheet borrowing that is not footnoted or is referenced obliquely, for instance -you could adjust the debt to equity ratio to reflect the true leverage of the firm (including the off-balance sheet debt). This would result in a higher levered beta (and cost of equity) and a higher assessment of default risk (resulting in a higher cost of debt).
Adjusting the discount rate to reflect complexity makes the most sense for firms where the complexity is obscuring the riskiness of the businesses that the firm is involved in and/or the financial leverage of the firm.
Adjust Expected Growth / Length of the Growth Period
In valuing any firm, two key inputs that determine value are the length of the growth period and the expected growth rate during the period. More fundamentally, it is the assumptions about excess returns on new investments made by the firm during the period that drive value. What is the relationship between complexity and these inputs? Since we derive our estimates of return on capital and excess returns from existing financial statements, you can argue that it is more difficult to • Estimate the return on capital on existing assets for firms where both earnings and capital are obscured by accounting choices.
• Make judgments on whether this return on capital can be sustained in the future.
One way to adjust the value of complex companies then is to assume a lower return on capital on future investments and assume that these excess returns will fade much more quickly. In practical terms, the lower expected growth rate and shorter growth periods that emerge will result in a lower value for the firm.
Apply a Complexity Discount
You could do a conventional valuation of a firm, using unadjusted cashflows, growth rates and discount rates, and then apply a discount to this value to reflect the complexity of its financial statements. But how would you quantify this complexity discount? There are several options:
1. One is to develop a rule of thumb, similar to those used by analysts who value private companies to estimate the effect of illiquidity. The problem with these rules of thumb is that they are not only arbitrary but that the same discount is applied to all complex firms.
2. A slightly more sophisticated option is to use a complexity scoring system, similar the one described in appendix 1 to measure the complexity of a firm's financial statements and to relate the complexity score to the size of the discount.
3. You could compare the valuations of complex firms to the valuation of simple firms in the same business, and estimate the discount being applied by markets for complexity. Since it is difficult to find otherwise similar firms, you can estimate this discount by looking at a large sample of traded firms and relating a standard multiple of value (say price to book ratios) to financial fundamentals (such as risk, growth and cashflows) and some measure of complexity (such as the complexity score). We did this on a limited basis for the hundred largest market capitalization firms and related price earnings ratios to expected growth rates, betas, payout ratios and number of pages in the 10K for each of these firms (as a measure of complexity). The regression is summarized below: 4. If a firm is in multiple businesses, and some businesses are simple and others are complex, you could value the company in pieces attaching no discount to the simple pieces and a much greater discount to the more complex parts of the firm. This may be the best strategy for a firm like General Electric, where information on some parts of the firm is easy to access while other parts of the firm are more complicated and difficult to value.
Relative Valuation
Most analysts value companies using multiples and comparable firms. How can this approach be modified to consider firms that are complex? While it is more difficult to assess the effect of complexity on relative value, you should consider the following options:
a. If a firm is in multiple businesses, you could value each business using a separate relative valuation and different comparable firms, rather than trying to attach one multiple to the entire company. If the firm reports revenues or earnings from unspecified businesses (where information is not provided or is withheld), your estimate of relative value for these businesses should be conservative. For instance, you could treat these earnings as both risky and low growth and apply a low multiple to estimate value.
b. As in the case of discounted cashflow valuation, you could do a conventional relative valuation (with no adjustment for complexity) and then discount the relative value for the complexity of the firm. The adjustment process would mirror that used for the discounted cashflow value.
As firms become more complex, relative valuation becomes much more difficult across the board since you need pure play firms with market prices to estimate the appropriate multiples.
Cures for Complexity
To preserve the integrity of financial markets, we must push to make the financial statements of firms both truthful and transparent. In this section, we will consider some of the ways in which we can push to make this a reality.
Legislation
In the aftermath of accounting scandals in the United States, legislation has inevitably followed. After the great depression and evidence of financial skullduggery, the Glass-Steagall Act was passed, restricting banks from investment activity, and the Securities Exchange Commission was created to regulate the trading of securities. In the aftermath of the collapse of the savings and loans in the 1980s, we saw increased regulation of financial service firms in general. It is likely that the latest crisis in accounting, precipitated by the implosion of Enron, will result in new laws designed to prevent a recurrence.
While the motivation for legislation is usually noble, new laws are blunt instruments that often create new problems while solving old ones. Restrictions on the granting of options to employees may prevent pension plans from being over-invested in a company's stock but they also undercut attempts to make managers have a stake in the company's success in financial markets. Restrictions on special purpose entities may take away legitimate avenues for firms to reduce their cost of borrowing. c. Firms should not be allowed to maintain different books for tax and reporting purposes.
Auditing and Accounting Integrity
The different rules followed in the two sets of books for depreciation, inventory valuation 20 It is a little unfair to pick on accountants alone in this regard. Investment bankers who design the special purpose entities for firms have their own conflicts of interest that skew the advice they offer to corporations.
21 Recent developments offer both promise and peril when it comes to acquisitions. It is good news (for analysts) that the pooling will no longer be allowed. It is not good news, however, that accountants will be called upon to make judgments on whether goodwill is impaired or not.
and expensing adds to the complexity of the statements and make it more difficult to value firms. It is the responsibility of analysts to demand information that they feel is critical in assessing the value of the firms they follow. For instance, analysts following a firm with substantial cross holdings are right to demand enough information about these cross holdings to value them. If the information is not forthcoming, they have to be willing to highlight this failure and use it as a justification for downgrading the firm. Clearly, if enough analysts demanded the information, the firm would find a way to provide it or risk serious punishment in the market.
As investors, it is easy to blame loose laws, incompetent auditors and snoozing analysts for complex companies that turn into investment disasters. However, we should recognize that we bear a substantial responsibility for our failures, since we do not have to buy stocks that analysts recommend. If, as investors, we refused to buy stock in companies 22 As a very simple example of the confusion created by the mixing of capital and manufacturing divisions, the debt reported by these companies is often large (reflecting the debt of the capital arm).
23 Note that this is a far weaker test than issuing sell recommendations. Analysts are reluctant to lower firms from a strong buy to a weak buy.
with complex financial statements (hence discounting value for complexity), we are providing the ultimate incentive for firms to eliminate or at least reduce complexity.
Stronger Corporate Governance
The key lesson of the Enron debacle should be that a strong and independent board is the best defense against firms manipulating earnings and hiding relevant facts from the market. It should force institutional investors who have been on the sidelines of this debate to be much more activist and push for changes in corporate governance. In particular, they should push for smaller boards with more outside directors, selected not by the CEO but by an independent group representing stockholders. The number of directorships that an individual can hold should be restricted and directors should have no other business relationship to the firm.
The issue of executive compensation has to be examined in conjunction with corporate governance. We continue to believe that providing managers with equity stakes in the firms they manage plays an important role in reducing the conflicts between managers and stockholders, but the granting of executive options to accomplish this has created significant side costs, two of which are listed below.
• The failure to consider the value of the options granted each year as an employee expense that year, which we noted earlier, has also lead to option grants whose value vastly exceeds what executives deserve to earn, given their performance.
• While options represent an equity position in the firm, their value is driven by factors that are different from those that determine common stock. In some cases, actions that reduce the value of common stock can increase the value of options.
Consider two examples. Investing in riskier businesses can make executive options more valuable, while making common stock less valuable. Though we could make a strong argument that stock buybacks are preferable to dividends for some firms, there can be no denying the fact that some firms are motivated to replace dividends with buybacks because their top managers have option positions that may be adversely affected by the payment of dividends. 24 We would recommend three changes. First, option grants should be valued at the time of the grant and calibrated to management performance. Second, boards should consider requiring top managers to buy stock in the firm rather than grant them options. Third, boards have to monitor both investment and dividend policy to ensure that they do not get hijacked by self serving managers with large option positions.
Conclusion
Are complex firms worth less than otherwise similar simple firms? In some cases, they are and we have examined both the sources of complexity in financial statements and the appropriate responses in valuation. Complexity is the result of business decisions made by the firm (you can diversity and make your business mix more complex), structuring decisions on how the firm is organized (holding structures and consolidation) and disclosure decisions (on how to reveal information to financial markets). Thus, firms can have complex financial statements even if they are in simple businesses because of accounting decisions they make. We developed a number of potential measures of complexity, ranging from a measure of opacity (developed by Price Waterhouse) to our complexity score (developed by asking a series of questions about companies).
If you trust managers to be unbiased in what information they reveal to markets and when they reveal this information, you could argue that complexity by itself is not a problem since the additional uncertainty created by uncertainty is essentially firm-specific and diversifiable. If, on the other hand, managers are more likely to use complexity to hide unpleasant or bad news (losses or debt), complexity will result in more negative surprises than positive ones. In this case, it is appropriate to discount value for complexity. The discounting can occur in one of the inputs to a discounted cashflow value -cashflows, growth rates or discount rates -or can take the form of a complexity discount on conventional (unadjusted) value.
It is quite clear that firms should avoid unnecessary complexity but the way to ensure this is often not new legislation or more accounting rules, since they have unintended side consequences. Instead, investors and analysts need to become more demanding of firms. If we consistently discounted the value of complex firms, we will create an incentive for simpler holding structures and more transparent financial statements.
